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The performance of individual stockbrokers differs. This paper aims at explaining these
differences, or at least at making some sense of them. In a study of fourteen stockbrokers, the
high performing brokers described their working life in a systematically different way, compared to
the low performing brokers. The high and low performing brokers gave fundamentally different
accounts of what, from an outsider’s viewpoint, seemed to be very similar work and working
conditions.
The brokers’ different accounts are interpreted and reconstructed into two opposing
narratives of stockbrokers’ world of working. In an ideal typical sense these two narratives explain,
or at least make sense of, the stockbrokers’ different levels of performance.
:K\VWXG\VWRFNEURNLQJ
The service sector is employing a larger and larger share of the workforce in the
industrial countries. Service production might be one of few areas in which both
productivity and the number of employees can increase (Grönroos 1992;
Gummesson 1993). At the same time, the service sector faces new challenges. New
markets, a more flexible and knowledgeable workforce, new technology, and
globalization increase demands on both competence and management skills.
Stock-broking is a service business that has faced great changes during the
last decade. National stockbrokerage firms face increasing international competition,
and technological development (such as electronic trading) puts pressure on
margins (Brown, 1996; Knight & Tinker, 1997). The internationalization is expected
to continue, and the legal framework is changing as the brokerage firms’ monopoly
on trading disappears (Brown, 1996; Abolafia, 1996). More and more private
investors become actively involved in trade, and, at the same time, the large
institutional investors increase their demands on analysis and on reduced
commissions (Knight, 1997).
Stockbrokers’ work is to a diminishing degree organized around material and
physical flows, and has developed into a work constituted by abstract flows of
quantitative information through different kinds of information technology media
(Abolafia, 1996; Knight & Morgan, 1995). Thus, the stock-brokerage firms can be
seen as forerunners compared to many other organizations. To study them might be2
a good way to increase the knowledge about how the work places of the future will
look in other parts of the service sector.
However, there is not much organizational research on stockbrokerage firms
or on people within them. Even though the financial markets and its actors often are
blamed for economic crises and downturns, and even though there are many myths
and stories about stock-broking, and even though more and more people are
employed in related jobs, there is a lack of systematic knowledge about the everyday
activities within stock-broking. This lack of research mirrors the economists’ lack of
discussion of the financial market as such. Douglass C. North puts it this way: “it is a
peculiar fact that the literature on economics… contains so little discussion of the
central institution that underlie neo-classical economics - the market” (Smelser and
Swedberg, 1994: 257). Smith’s metaphor “the invisible hand” still seems to be in
power.
6WRFNEURNHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH
Traditional finance theory (Brealey and Myers, 1991; Dornbusch and Fisher,
1994) builds on assumptions about an existing perfect market. Regardless of this
tradition's inability to explain “anomalies” as excess returns on investments or
radical market changes, the traditional finance theory is of little importance here.
In the here reported study the aim is to study WKHSHRSOH behind the aggregated
data used by finance theorists, without assumptions about perfect markets,
perfect information or rational actors.
Existing studies of actors in the financial sector either do not focus
performance measures at all or focus on how empirical behavior deviates from
models of perfect markets and rational decision models. In an DQWKURSRORJLFDO
approach (i.e. Reddy, 1984; Abolafia, 1981, 1996) the focus is on describing and
understanding the development of historical or existing “market cultures”. Usually
performance measures are not in focus or of an aggregated/collective character
such as “market crisis” or “speculative bubble” (Abolafia, 1996). In a VRFLRORJLFDO
approach (i.e. DiMaggio 1978, Swedberg 1994) the focus is on constructing a
structural market theory that is able to handle more empirical variation than the
formal economic models. Both the anthropological and the sociological
approaches differ from the approach presented here in that they do not interest
themselves in differences between individual human beings, neither when
discussing “culture” nor performance. The focus here is very much more on a
micro level compared to the anthropological and sociological focus on collectives
and macro structures.
The  EHKDYLRUDO ILQDQFH approach (Thaler, 1993; Olsen, 1998; Scott,
Stumpp & Xu, 1999) tries to explain market anomalies by applying models of
decision making, borrowed from individual psychology, on different kind of market
behavior. Even if the explanatory models focus micro levels (individual person’s
decision-making), the empirical studies usually consist  of aggregated statistics.
Propositions concerning market behavior are deduced from the psychological
models and tested on aggregated market data.
In the here reported study a EXVLQHVVapproach to performance is taken.
Instead of using some kind of market behavior measure as benchmark (for3
instance comparing individual brokers’ market judgments with actual market
behavior) the aim is to explain differences in courtage revenues of fourteen
stockbrokers working at the same stock-brokerage firm. Such an explanation
should be of high relevance for any stock-broking firm, as well as for related
businesses. The approach applied here can be said to be RUJDQL]DWLRQDO. Instead
of testing models psychological models on market data, the stockbrokers’ own
accounts of what they do, complemented with direct observation of what they do,
is the main empirical material in the analysis.
One way to illustrate the rather major differences between the brokers’
revenues is to focus their accumulated courtage over a year. The picture that
emerges shows pretty clearly that the brokers’ performance differs and that it




























































Graph 1: Fourteen stockbrokers’ accumulated individual courtage (x: week, 
Y: courtage)
Graph 1 shows that the top-performing broker out-performs the worst performing
broker with more than eight times. The graph also shows that the top three
brokers’ yearly courtage revenues amounts to almost seven times more than the
bottom three (the rather late in the year employed broker excluded in both
cases). One might wonder why?
Are the top-performing brokers more competent? Do they have different
skills? Are they working harder? Do they have a longer or a different history of
learning? Or, could it be something else? The main purpose in this paper is to
construct a plausible answer to the question of why some brokers out-perform
others. The answer will be searched for in stories told by the brokers them
selves, describing their work with their own words. Do the brokers different’
performances have any relation to some kind of differences in their descriptions
of their work? And if so, how can this relation be interpreted? Are there any
hidden messages in the narratives told by the brokers? Messages that can help
us to make sense of the brokers’ different performance?4
1DUUDWLYHVWKHRU\DQGSHUIRUPDQFH
Explaining differences in performance has been of high interest within
organizational science since at least scientific management. Scientific
management, the human relation school and the contingency tradition, to
mention a few influential approaches, were all trying to construct theoretical
accounts explaining some sort of organizational performance.
The contemporary “narrative approaches” to organizational analysis
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1993; Sköldberg, 1994; Czarniawska, 1997), are less
concerned with constructing theory, as well as with explaining performance. Like
many other (old and contemporary) constructionist approaches, the interest lies
in detecting or constructing meaningful accounts that facilitates understanding of,
and sometimes critical reflection upon, organizational life (e. g. Burell and Morgan
1979; Alvesson 1993). What constitutes these meaningful accounts, and what
they are good for, is not always explicitly stated in the literature on narratives and
organizing, but some answers can be found. Fiol (1990: 378) argues that
“narrative semiotics” is a efficient mean of “uncovering underlying meanings that
would otherwise remain imperceptible”. Czarniawska-Joerges (1993: 8) states
that “narrative fiction can play an important role in the development of
imagination for action”. Sköldberg (1994: 222) argues that “As a ‘story about
stories,’ its value depends mainly on whether it will be successful in opening up a
new way of seeing things, thus improving the understanding of …[organizational
life]”.
One important aspect of the narrative approach is not only a disinterest in
theory, but also a somewhat critical or ambivalent attitude towards theoretical
accounts and theoretical explanations. According to Brunner  (1986, 1990) the
relation between narrative and theoretical (“logo-scientific/paradigmatic”)
knowledge is antinomious. Regarding explanation as something related to theory,
and understanding as something related to meaningful narratives, explanation
becomes hard to combine with a narrative approach.
1 Czarniawska on the other
hand, emphasizes that
«HYHQDIOHHWLQJJODQFHDWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOQDUUDWLYHVUHYHDOVWKDWWKH
H[SODQDWLRQ DQG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV DSSHDU VLGH E\ VLGH FRQIXVLQJ DQG
UHSODFLQJRQHDQRWKHUVRPHWLPHVE\GHVLJQDQGVRPHWLPHVE\GHIDXOW´
&]DUQLDZVND-RHUJHV
In this paper the later position is taken. The differences between the “narrative”
and the “scientific” is viewed as a difference in what rhetorical devices are used in
a text, in this one by me, the author. The purpose here is to construct different
narratives of a specific sphere of working and organizational life; stock-broking in
a stock-brokerage firm trading on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. These
                                           
1  The devision of science in an “explanatory” natural science and an “interpretive” cultural
science is often blamed on Dilthey, in organizational studies we usually put the blame on
Burell & Morgan (1979). I also think Silverman’s critique of the Anglo-American
organizational theory during the 1960:ies (Silverman, 1970) has increased the gulf between
the two “paradigms”.5
accounts can be viewed as both narratives, expressing otherwise “imperceptible
underlying meanings”, that once expressed can enhance our understanding of
stock-broking life as such, and as theoretical accounts, to some extent explaining
stockbrokers’ performance. To call accounts both “narrative” and “theoretical”
might annoy proponents from both camps (literature theory/critique and
interpretative social science on the one hand and natural science and positivistic
social science on the other). But, as hopefully will be shown, narrative knowledge
can have just as powerful explanatory value as any formal theory. From the
position taken here, there is no contradiction between constructing meaningful
narratives and explaining.
³$ QDUUDWLYH LV RUGLQDU\ XQGHUVWRRG DV D VHTXHQWLDO DFFRXQW RI HYHQWV
XVXDOO\ FKURQRORJLFDO ZKHUHE\ VHTXHQWLDOLW\ LQGLFDWHV VRPH NLQG RI





The here reported results derive from a study of fourteen stockbrokers that
worked at the same stock-brokerage firm in Stockholm, trading on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange.
2 They were all working next to each other around the same
trading-table. They participated in the same morning-meetings, listened to the
same analysts. They all had the same type of router-monitors and were all
informed by the same on-line news subscriptions. They were also dealing with
the same type of clients (wealthy private investors).
All brokers were interviewed in the same room next to the trading-room
during one and a one a half hour, immediately preceding the opening of the
exchange. The interviews were conducted during two month when the Stockholm
Stock Exchange was characterized as strong and stable. The interviews followed
a “phenomenographic” approach (Merton, 1981, 1986; Dall’Alba & Hasselgren,
1996). They were highly unstructured and geared at producing an as rich,
detailed and concrete description of the interviewees’ world of working as
possible. All interviews were transcribed before the interpretative work started.
This work was also inspired by a “phenomenographic” approach (se below).
7KHVWRFNEURNHUVVWRULHVRIWKHLUZRUNLQJOLIH
An initial attempt to find some kind of pattern in the stockbrokers’ descriptions of
their work resulted in the extraction of four distinct types of stories or “dramas”
(Sköldberg 1994: 220) from the empirical material. These dramas can be said to
express a discursive level of meanings in the brokers’ stories. Later in the
                                           
2 The Stockholm Stock Exchange is the leading market place for Swedish and to some extent
Scandianivan securities. Its dominant activity is the trading of equities through its electronic
trading system SAX, to which members have access. Both users and companies that are listed
or quoted on the exchange pay fees. The users’ fees are based on value and number of
executed trades, and the listed companies’ fees are based on market values).6
analysis these dramas will be problematized and finally result in the construction
of two opposing narratives, hopefully expressing deeper meaning-structures in
the brokers’ description of their work. A minimalist description of the four dramas
would be as follows:
7KHURPDQWLFGUDPDRIFRPSOH[LW\
My work is really demanding, both mentally and physically speaking. Everyday is
unique and has its own challenges. There is all the background information about
all the happenings in, and related to, the business world. I have to follow the TV-
news from early morning, read the papers on my way to work, and then listen
carefully to the analysts and colleagues, all before the exchange opens. At the
same time I have to check the news on the router. All this information has to be
taken in and processed before the exchange opens. But this is just the beginning.
At nine o’clock the real work begins. The first one or two hours are usually even
more intense than the rest of the day. But any time during the day something can
happen and change everything. You are making decisions all the time. Whom to
call, what to recommend, how to react. All at the same time you have to follow
the exchange’s movements on the router, scan the news, recommend different
transactions to different clients as well as listen to your clients’ information. Being
able to do this efficiently is what makes you a good stockbroker. I love my work. It
is very challenging, and I lear a lot every day.
7KHWUDJHG\RIERUHGRP
My work is really simple. I can’t really understand why it is so well paid. If you
know how to talk your clients, and after a couple of years that isn’t very hard, all
you have to do is to give the impression that you know something they don’t. The
work runs by itself. Each day is more or less the same. You sit in front of your
router, you listen to the “noise” in the trading room, and you talk to your clients
over the phone. What to say is evident from what your colleagues are doing, and
they are doing the same as you are. You don’t need any specific information or to
be able to do any advanced type of analysis. It is like selling vacuum cleaners or
any other simple product. If it weren’t for the money, I would never keep this job.
But as for now, I can’t afford to do anything else.
7KHFRPHG\RIFRPSHWLWLRQ
It is like playing an interactive combat-game with your friends on your computer.
When I get news on my router I immediately evaluate it, not the news in itself but
how my competitors might be reacting to it. Sometimes it is a five-second news;
sometimes it is a 15-second. By that I mean that it is possible to make some
money on it in the next five or 15 seconds, after that it’s to late - the others are
giving or have given the same recommendation to the same type of clients as I
have. I have a pretty good picture of which brokers I am playing against. There
are not that many brokers at that many stock-brokerage firms dealing with the
same types of stocks and the same types of clients as I am. A good stockbroker
is the one who is the best competitor in the game. If I am faster in judging how7
my competitors will react on a specific item of news, and in getting clients to do
business, then I am the best. It’s a fun game.
7KHWDOHRILQGXVWULDOZLVGRP
To me stock-broking is about understanding the world, and making something out
of that understanding. It’s pretty easy to get stuck in the short-term noise, to only
try to make money on the latest news or trend. I’m conservative, maybe too
conservative, but I want to understand what is going on out there in the industrial
life. I have always been interested in analyzing companies; I have my favorite
branches and my favorite companies. I could never recommend a customer to
sell or by only on short-term noise. Working as a stockbroker gives you a chance
to improve your understanding of companies and of life itself.
The four stories should not to be viewed as the essence, or an attempt to
approximate the essence, of individual stockbrokers’ conception of their work.
There is more or less expression of all four stories in each stockbroker’s
description of his work (they were all male). Each description was more or less
inconsistent, more or less full of contradictions and paradoxes. The four stories
should be viewed as ideal types (Weber 1983:4-9, 15, 16; Schutz, 1962:38-42,
1964:17,  18,  81-83) rather than approximations. They have been constructed
with the aim of maximizing the differences between them as well as maximizing
the consistency within them.
However, to be able to explain, or at least make sense of each
stockbroker’s performance, measured in their accumulated courtage revenue, we
have to investigate each stockbroker’s description and its relation to the four
stories. We know that the four types of stories are extracted from the
descriptions, but we don’t know how much, or in what extent, my typified four
description resembles each broker’s description. To be able to determine to what
extent each broker’s description relates to each of the four stories, a
phenomenografic approach (Merton, 1981, 1986; Sandberg, 1994: 52-90;
Dall’Alba & Hasselgren, 1996) was applied.
7KHSKHQRPHQRJUDSKLFHVVHQFHRIVWRFNEURNLQJ
The relation between my four typified stories and the stories told by the fourteen
brokers could be investigated on a more “shallow” level, or on the level of
GLVFRXUVH. It could also be investigated on a more “deep” level of meaning, or on
the level of WKRXJKWILJXUH (Asplund, 1979; 1991). The investigation here aims at
grasping the relation on the level of WKRXJKWILJXUHrather than on the level of
discourse There are many interpretative approaches and many different
interpretative devices that focus on detecting underlying meanings in texts. One
of them is the phenomenographic approach (Merton, 1981, 1986; Sandberg,
1994: 52-90; Dall’Alba & Hasselgren, 1996).
The phenomenografic approach to interpreting texts has similarities with
both traditional content analysis and with semiotic analysis, but also some
important differences. Compared to content analysis (Krippendorff, 1980;
McCormack, 1982) the phenomenographic approach relies less on counting8
words, sentences or any other sub-unit of a text, and relies more on intuitive
interpretations and different types of (phenomenological) reflections upon, and
logical investigations of, these interpretations. The choice of phenomenography
over content analysis is motivated by the fact that counting words does not
necessary say very much about the underlying meanings of those words (Fiol,
1990: 378). To get beneath the discourse level of meaning, the
phenomenographic approach is preferred.
Compared to semiotic analyses (Eco, 1979; Fiol, 1990) the
phenomenografic approach does not offer an as formalized method as semiotics.
Instead it can be said to be more inductive, or attempting to be as faithful, or
sensitive, as possible to the interwees’ own conceptions of the studied
phenomena (Merton 1986; Sandberg, 1994: 64). The more formalized semiotic
analysis produces a rather specific structure of a text’s underlying meaning which
does not necessary inform us about the relation between each stockbrokers’
description and the here constructed four stories. In this explorative study it is
important to give the empirical material a chance to influence the results. Thus, in
this study, the less formalized, but more inductive approach of phenomenography
seems to be more appropriate than semiotics.
The interpretative device used here does not need to be very precise, only
to enable a rough evaluation of the extent to which each of the fourteen
stockbrokers’ descriptions relates to the four earlier constructed dramas of stock-
broking. My experience of phenomenography is that it lacks precision, which, in
this study, is an acceptable drawback.
The phenomenographic interpretations of the transcribed interviews
resulted in that the fourteen transcripts could be clustered as illustrated by the
following table:
The drama of The tragedy of      The comedy of    The tale of Accum.
Broker complexity boredom competition industrial wisdom  courtage
a 3 1 3 5 8816  (1)
b 3 1 5 5 6885  (2)
c 4 1 4 3 3871  (3)
d 3 2 1 5 2793  (4)
e 1 5 2 2 2002  (5)
f 1 4 2 4 2002
3 (5)
g 4 2 3 3 1849  (7)
h 3 3 2 3 1737  (8)
i 5 1 4 2 1693  (9)
j 2 1 3 5 1358 (10)
k 1 4 1 5 1270 (11)
l 3 1 2 5 1027 (12)
m 2 2 3 3 1013 (13)
n 5 1 3 1 198    (14)
Table 1: A rough (phenomenografic) interpretation of the resemblance between the individual
brokers’ descriptions and the four typified stories, on a scale from 1 (almost none) to 5 (very close). 
                                           
3 The two brokers that share the fifth place also share customer accounts. This means that
there is no way for them or for anyone else to differentiate their accumulated courtage. Here
they are treated the same way as the are by the stock-brokerage firm. Their total courtage are
split in two similar parts (4004/2=2002).9
Using numbers to express meaning constructed in interpretative analysis might annoy
the constructionist purist. Needless to say, these numbers should only be regarded as
hints or rough interpretations. They will not be treated as adequate “statistical
information” or as “social facts” (Durkheim, [1895] 1991:  103-110;
Bourdieu, 1984: 54, 1992: 258-9, 507, not 8). Treating the numbers as what they are -
rhetorical devises that sometimes efficiently express meaningful accounts - should calm
the purist’s critique. An important role these numbers can fill is to fuel the forthcoming
analysis.
Even though the empirical material is much to small to fulfill positivistic demands
on material appropriate for statistical analysis, a quick look at the numbers in table 1
invites to some preliminary interpretations. First one is striked by the relative similarity
between the top and bottom of the list. But we can also easily detect that the top-
performing brokers’ stories have higher total resemblance with the four dramas than the
lowest performing brokers (the top three have totals of 12, 14 and 12 while the bottom
three have 11, 10 and1). It is possible to detect many more correlations between
courtage and the fourteen stories’ relations to the four dramas, and this with rather
simple statistical methods. But these correlations cannot be described as strong. Other
quantitative data, as the broker’s age and number of years working as broker, correlate
more strongly with the accumulated courtage (these numbers are not included in table
1). And, in my opinion, such results are of limited interest in themselves. They do not
fulfill the constructionist’s demands of interesting interpretation. Instead of “uncovering
underlying meanings that would otherwise remain imperceptible” (Fiol, 1990:378), this
kind of correlations state the obvious, or almost obvious. It is not very ground breaking
news that expertise develops with time (Anderson, 1985). It is not very ground breaking
news that persons with complex and differentiated cognitive structures can cope better
with many tasks than persons with simple and undifferentiated structures (Zajonc, 1960;
Björkegren, 1989). If one likes, the figures in table 1 can be interpreted as supporting
these well-known results from cognitive psychology. The results seem to be valid also for
stockbrokers. Here, these kinds of interpretations will be left to their own destiny. We will
only use them as a starting point for “uncovering underlying meanings”. Instead of being
quasi-positivists, treating bad statistics on a too small sample as good research, we will
continue the interpretative work according to another strategy. We will look at individual
cases and try to construct interpretations on a level below statistical data and below
discourse.
&RPSDULQJLQGLYLGXDOFDVHV
Both the figures regarding courtage and “the tale of industrial wisdom” in table 1 can be
interpreted as indications of learning and increased expertise. The longer you have been
working as a broker, the more industrial wisdom you have accumulated and the more
courtage you earn. But the same does not seem to be true for the other three dramas.
The first, second and third best performing brokers out-perform the rest with quite
a distance. Compared to the fourth, fifth and sixth performing broker, these differences
in performance cannot be explained by the number of years they have worked as
brokers (or by their age). The top six brokers are, with one exception, old “veteran
brokers” with many years in the trade. The exception, the relatively less experienced
broker, also happens to be the very best performing broker of them all. Therefore the10
distance between the best and the rest, and between the one, two and three best and
the rest of the six “veteran brokers”, are of special interest. Can we find any hidden
messages in their stories that make sense of the differences in performance?
Focusing the six best-performing brokers in table 1, we can see that the top two,
and to some extent also the top three brokers’ stories differ from the fourth to sixth
ranked brokers. The fourth to sixth ranked brokers seems to express “the tragedy of
boredom” much more than the top three. The expressions of “the comedy of
competition” and “the drama of complexity” mirror this relation. The top three brokers
seem to conceive their work as more of a fun computer game, and the top four brokers
as a more complex activity, than the rest of the six “veterans”. Why do some of the six
veteran brokers’ stories express boredom and maybe even alienation, while others’
stories express challenging tasks and fun games? This seems to be a key issue to
understand why some brokers out-perform others.
It is not surprising that the inexperienced broker conceives his
4 work as
challenging, complex and interesting. And it is not very surprising that, with time, the
inexperienced broker gains experience. But the new experience, and here the empirical
material indicates two possible developments, seems to make the work either (1) less
complex, less interesting, and more boring, or (2) more relaxed, still challenging, and
more of a fun game. In the first of the suggested developments, the broker finally ends
up as alienated, earning good money on his industrial wisdom, but he do not become a
top-performer because of the tragedy of boredom. The other development implies that
the broker does gain experience and industrial wisdom, but instead of finding his work
less and less interesting, the broker find new challenges and complexities in the game
against other brokers. Finding, creating and recreating these new dimensions of stock-
broking makes them top-performers. 
:RUNDQGLQWHUDFWLRQ
If we could better understand these two different ways of conceiving a stockbroker’s
work, and WKHRULJLQDQGGHYHORSPHQW of these two conceptions, we would also be able
to make better sense of the brokers’ differences in performance. One way of reaching
such an understanding is to make use of established theories of human work and
interaction. Another way is to take a closer look into the stockbrokers’ stories. We will go
both ways, starting with the latter. One of the more bored brokers (broker “e” in table 1)
told me the following.
³2QWKLQJWKDWDFWXDOO\ZDVLQWHUHVWLQJLQP\ZRUNZDVZKHQZHKDG
PDMRUSUREOHPVLQWKHILUP:HZHUHLQVHULRXVFULVLVGXULQJDQGDIWHU




                                           
4 To denote a specific type of worker a “he” feels awkward. Usually I make a point out of using
“she” instead of “he” (regarding gender and equality). But since all the brokers in my study
are men, it would feel even more awkward to transform them into a “she”, or to rewrite them
into a “he or she”, implying a gender-structure that do not exist (compare with Abolafia, 1996:
195, note 6)11
The quote is interesting. One can interpret the story, as an expression of that work was
more fun ten years ago. Before the broker was experienced enough to conceive his work
as boring. But the broker’s story tells us more. What he describes as an interesting part
of his work is not his work as a stockbroker. It is not even his everyday work as a
stockbroker ten years ago. What he describes is something that differs from his current
and past everyday work. He tells us that building a firm was, and maybe still is “real fun”.
Probably he was rather inexperienced as a company-builder back then. The same thing
- inexperience - that made him appreciate the work as a broker the first one or two
years, makes him long back to the aftermath of the crisis 1987. Is it that simple, we need
variation and new tasks to be motivated at work? Well, a good bulk of research informs
us that this could be the case (Hertzberg, 1966; Ouchi, 1981; Fullan, Miles & Taylor
1981). This explanation is one of the core results within the “human relation school”.
There we can also find another result explaining the broker’s nostalgia of building
companies - participative management.  The broker describes himself as a builder of a
stock-brokerage firm. He describes himself as a manager not as managed by someone
else. This can be interpreted as an example of praticipative management which,
according to many studies (for a review see Katsell and Yankelovich, 1974), is found to
improve both motivation and productivity.
But the results from the human relation school have been criticized and
questioned in almost every possible direction (Perrow, 1986). And regardless of these
explanations and their critiques, the human relation school does not help us to explain
why some of the veteran brokers are bored while others are not. Most of them
experienced the crisis in 1987, and all of them work under similar objective conditions.
Still, they conceive their work as very different. The bored broker continues:
³:HDUHVWLOODOLWWOHJURXSZLWKLQRXUJURXSKHUH:HKDYHH[SHULHQFHV
WKDWJOXHXVWRJHWKHU,GRQ¶WKDYHDQ\UHDOXVHIRUWKLVLQP\ZRUNEXW
ZHDUHVWLOODOLWWOHJURXS´(Broker “e” in table1)
What the bored broker describes as interesting work is not only something different than
his everyday work as a broker, it is not only something that happened many years ago, it
is not only something he is relatively inexperienced at, it is not only something that has to
do with formal authority, it is also a story of VRFLDO interaction. It is a story about SHRSOH,
today old IULHQGV, accomplishing something WRJHWKHU, and it is a story about work where
you do not have any use of this friendship, of these people or of working together. The
broker’s story seems to imply a conflict between social interaction and motivation on the
one hand and work and boredom on the other. Is it a lack of social interaction at work
that creates the tragedy of boredom? And if so why aren’t every broker bored?
A closer reading of the top two or three performing brokers’ descriptions of their
work shows that these brokers conceive their work as highly social. In the drama “the
comedy of competition”, this is rather easy to detect. Here, stock-broking, is nothing you
do in solitude, or in an anonymous noise, it is an interactive game, played with or against
your friends. Yes, it is a challenge to beat your friends in this game, but it is also
challenging to stand a working day in solitude. The important difference is WKHH[LVWHQFH
RU QRQH[LVWHQFH RI D VRFLDO GLPHQVLRQ LQWHJUDWHG DV D QHFHVVDU\ SDUW RI WKH12
VWRFNEURNHUV¶ZRUN. Even if the interaction is not face-to face, the top performing brokers






The stockbrokers’ work and their social interaction are of special interest because of
earlier investigations of ZRUN and LQWHUDFWLRQ. Some of these investigations treat work
and interaction the same way as the brokers’ do in my interpretation, that is; work and
interaction are treated as being in conflict with each other.
The relation between work and interaction has been investigated by, among
others, Hegel, Marx and Habermas. ,QWHUDFWLRQ, to young Hegel (in the so-called Jena
lectures 1803-1806, discussed in Habermas, 1984:181-208), is the result of dialectic
processes taken place through the media of language, the media of work, and the media
of love and conflict. But even if work is one of three media for interaction, ZRUN is also
medium through which the subject and spirit can free themselves from the immediate
dictates of nature. With the development of instruments the subject becomes free from
nature, but the instruments also discipline the subject’s instincts, animalistic drives and
pleasures.  ,QWHUDFWLRQ, in Habermas reading of Hegel, develops a “mutual
acknowledging consciousness”, necessary for communicational unity. In
communicational unity subjects play games with or against each other (Habermas
1984:190-192).  :RUN, on the other hand, develops a “cunning consciousness”
necessary for transforming nature to instruments and objectifying subject to objects. In
work, subjects play games, not with or against other subjects but against objectified
subjects. In work, subjects become objects and the play becomes control.
Habermas own scheme of communicative and instrumental action (Habermas,
1988: 149-203, 303-370) has been interpreted in many different ways. For the purpose
here, understanding stockbrokers different performances, one of the interpretations
suggested by McCarthy (1988:16-40) is useful: Habermas “instrumental action”,
renamed by McCarthy (1988:26) to “purposive-rational action”, designates activity similar
to Hegel’s “work”. Habermas “communicative action”, by McCarthy (1988) renamed
“social interaction”, designates activity similar to Hegel’s “interaction”. According to
McCarthy, “purposive-rational action” (instrumental action or work) is;
³«JRYHUQHG E\ WHFKQLFDO UXOHV DQG GHFLVLRQ PD[LPV WKDW LPSO\
FRQGLWLRQDOSUHGLFWLRQVDVZHOODVSUHIHUHQFHUXOHVDQGGHFLVLRQPD[LPV









Both types of actions should be regarded as analytical types. In real life, purposive-
rational/instrumental action/work is always embedded in norms, and social
interaction/communicative action always implies reflexive actors accomplishing mutual
understanding. McCarthy (1988:27) suggests that we can see the two types as DVSHFWV
of the same activity. In our case we might see it as Hegel does; as two types of
consciousness that develop together with the birth of the self and the spirit, or translated
to fit the case of stock-broking, two conceptions that develop when stockbrokers gain
experience. But, applied on our stockbrokers’ work, the two analytical types can help us
more.
Following young Hegel’s line of thinking (Habermas 1984: 181-208), the
inexperienced broker (Hegel’s “empty subject”) first learns symbols and language to be
able to cope with the both social and technical work of stock-broking. With the help of
language the young stockbroker can conceive what his colleagues are doing and
thereby learn to improve performance. This is a prerequisite for both the
cunning/instrumental and the communicative/social conception of stock-broking to
develop.
If, and here we deduce from the analytical type of instrumental action, the
stockbroker foremost is striving after measurable success, that is to improve his
performance in terms of courtage revenues, he will have a tendency to develop an
objectified instrumental conception of work. If, and here we deduce from the analytical
type of communicative action, the stockbroker foremost is striving for appreciation from
his colleagues, he will have a tendency to develop a socialized interactionist conception
of work.
Initially, the instrumental conception might work just fine. It reduces the
complexities and uncertainties that working as a stockbroker initially is felt to involve. It
might even result in a faster development of high-performance than a socialized
interactionist conception of stock-broking. But, following Hegel’s description of the once
“empty” then “working” subject, the instrumental reduction of uncertainties also affects
the broker himself. The instrumental conception implies an objectification not only of
artifacts but also of other people, including customers, colleagues and others. The
experience gained and the initially improved performance therefore transform the work
from being conceived as learning from colleges (interacting with language) to work
performed in solitude. With time the solitude makes the work boring and demotivating,
and performance stops to improve. The broker does what he must and dreams about
times gone when he and his friends worked and interacted at the same time, when they
were “building a company”.
The socialized interactionist conception of stock-broking also reduces
uncertainties that the stock-broker initially experiences. But it does not objectify artifacts
and people. Instead it socializes the relatively abstract work of stock-broking. Instead of
reading figures and anonymous news on the router, the social stockbroker develops
social images of colleagues, competitors, and others. The work becomes less uncertain,14
and therefore more relaxing than initially, but also more social. It becomes “a challenging
game”. Playing the game motivates the social stockbroker to continue to improve his
performance. Even though was performance never conceived as the most important
aspect of work, in time, the interactional broker will outperform the instrumental.
7KHWDOHRILQGXVWULDOZLVGRP
So far in the analysis, I have been drawing extensively on Hegel and Habermas as well
as three of the four earlier constructed dramas (“the drama of complexity”, “the tragedy
of boredom”, and “the comedy of competition”). But the fourth story, “the tale of industrial
wisdom”, has only been mentioned briefly. One reason for having waited to include this
drama in the analysis is because it correlates neither with performance, nor with the
dramas “the tragedy of boredom” or “the tale of industrial wisdom” (see table 1). That is,
a broker that tells a story that resembles the tale of industrial wisdom could both be
interpreted as a highly bored and lonely broker or as a highly playful and social broker.
He could be both a high or relatively low performing veteran broker. If one likes, one can
find a correlation between “the tale of industrial wisdom” and the number of years the
brokers have been working as a broker RUwithUHODWHGEXVLQHVV. However one then has
to define what is and what is not a “related industry”. I cannot see how this could be
done in a somewhat rigorous way. Instead, one is tempted to define “related industry” to
fit the analysis, without an explicit strategy or criteria for why a specific business should
be regarded as more related than another. But instead of falling into that quasi-
positivistic trap, we can dig deeper into the tale of industrial wisdom itself. What are the
brokers saying about industrial wisdom, given the interpretation of the other dramas?
From our conclusions so far, is it possible to distinguish between different types of
industrial wisdom?
The question is obviously rhetorical. If one look close enough, it is of course
possible to distinguish between different types of industrial wisdom. And the expressed
differences can also, rather easily, be clustered into two categories. The following quotes
are excellent illustrations of these two categories:
³2YHU WKH \HDUV \RX OHDUQ WKH WULFNV RI WKH WUDGH <RX JHW PRUH
FRPIRUWDEOHZLWKFHUWDLQLQGXVWULHVDQGFHUWDLQVWRFNV<RXOHDUQKRZWR
UHDGWKHVHPRYHPHQWVRQWKHURXWHU<RXOHDUQKRZWRWDONDERXWWKHP
WR \RXU FXVWRPHUV 7KH ZRUN EHFRPHV« LW EHFRPHV VR PXFK PRUH
FRPIRUWDEOH RQFH \RX NQRZ WKLV <RX JUDGXDOO\ VWDUW WR UHO\ RQ \RXU
µ)LQJHUVSLW]JHIKO




FXVWRPHU UHDFW RQ« OHW XV WDNH D UHFHQW H[DPSOH D FKDQJH RI D
PDQDJLQJGLUHFWRU"+RZZLOOWKDWFKDQJHDIIHFW9ROYR"6KRXOG,EX\RU
VHOO" 2YHU WKH \HDUV \RX OHDUQ WR GR WKLV ZLWK OHVV DQG OHVV HIIRUW´
%URNHU³D´LQWDEOH15
Both these quotes can be interpreted as expressions of learning “industrial wisdom”. But
given our conclusions so far, it is not hard to distinguish them from each other. The
analysis above makes it possible to distinguish between objectified instrumental
industrial wisdom from socialized interactionist industrial wisdom. The first quote tells us
that the important industrial wisdom is “reading movements on the router” and “how to
talk to the customers”. When you gain experience, this becomes a part of your intuitive
feeling – your wisdom. But the router is an “instrument” in Hegel’s terminology
(Habermas 1984). This instrument, together with the objectification of companies to
numbers on the router, is a part of the creation of the “cunning” (Hegel) or “instrumental”
(Habermas) conception of stock-broking. This is also expressed in the formulation “talk
WR” and not “talk ZLWK´ the customer. An instrumental conception seems to have a
tendency, as we earlier concluded, to make the broker isolated, bored and maybe even
alienated.
The other quote tells us about the importance of learning to take the perspective
of other people and to personalize companies into their management teams. According
to Hegel (Habermas, 1984), this ability is only possible given a communicative unity or a
world spirit. And according to our earlier conclusions this is an expression of a social and
playful conception of stock-broking. With time this interactional conception seems to
influence brokers to perform better than brokers conceiving their work as instrumental.
7ZRRSSRVLQJQDUUDWLYHV
The analysis has resulted in the construction of two opposing narratives: The
narrative of the objectified instrumental stockbroker, and the narrative of the
socialized interactional stockbroker.
In developing these narratives, a processual account of their birth has been
constructed. The inexperienced broker becomes an experienced broker that describes
his work as either foremost instrumental or foremost interactional, but in the here
forwarded interpretation, not both. On a discursive level, on the level of the brokers’
descriptions and the four constructed stories, there are many inconsistencies and
contradictions. One and the same broker expresses alienation and fascination, both
complexity and simplicity, and so on. But on a deeper level of meaning, constructed
here, on the level of thought figure, the majority of the broker’s descriptions can be
categorized as either expressing an instrumental or an interactional narrative.
These results are most certainly a consequence of the chosen interpretative
devices (inspired by phenomenography, and by Hegel’s and Habermas’ view on work
and social interaction). They are probably a consequence of the chosen empirical
material (fourteen stockbrokers at a stock-brokerage firm trading at the Stockholm Stock
Exchange). But the results are also a consequence of the interest behind the study,
namely the interest in trying to explain differences in individual stockbrokers’
performance. To be able to explain the differences between individuals stockbrokers’
performance, it follows that one has to be able to distinguish differences between the
individual stockbrokers also concerning the explanatory factor, in this case the two
opposing narratives. If one wants to regard the here constructed narratives as explaining
performance, it follows that they are opposing. They do not necessary have to be
regarded as mutual exclusive, but as two extreme poles on a scale. On this scale, high16
performance correlates with high degree of interactionality expressed in the brokers’
descriptions. Likewise, low performance correlates with expressed instrumentality.
It is possible to disagree with the hard categorization of the brokers’ stories into
the two narratives implied above, and still appreciate the narratives as informative
(regarding them as DVSHFWV of the same phenomenon instead of two extremes). In this
case the inductive aspects of the construction of the two narratives are given less
importance, and the deductive and goal-oriented aspects are given priority. In my
opinion the two readings do not contradict each other. They are an expression of how
much one believes in the possibility to evaluate the quality of the link between second-
order constructions and the empirical material these constructions partly orginate from.
From a more postmodern position all such claims are nonsense, from a less “flat
ontology” the claims are valid and a question of rigor. Regardless of this difficult and
maybe indeterminable question, one can always find some comforting notes in the world
of theory. Habermas states that “a subject that are treated as an object of instrumental
action in this way retains a capacity for communicative relations, that is, remains as a
potential partner or rival in interaction” (McCarthy: 1988: 29). This implies that any action
can be interpreted both as (1) either instrumental or interactional, depending on what
aspect one focus, and as (2) a question of degree (as has been done in this analysis so
far).
&RQVWUXFWLQJWRSSHUIRUPLQJEURNHUV
If we believe in Habermas statement of that objectification never can be total, and that
there always is a potential capacity for communicative relations (McCarthy: 1988:29).
Then the here suggested results should be of high pragmatic interest for the bored and
not top-performing brokers, as well as for their employers. The statement implies that no
matter how bad the situation is regarding a broker’s motivation and performance, there is
always a way back, or forward, to become less instrumental and more interactional at
work. How this is achieved is a question outside the scope of this paper, but the question
raises another question, more in line with the analysis here. The answer to the question
of how to change a broker’s conception of work depends on what view one has on how
that conception was created in the first place.
  The earlier use of Hegel indicates that the creation of a instrumental or
interactional conception of work is a question of long historical processes, applied on an
individual broker, at least since his early childhood. Drawing on Habermas one gets the
same impression. It is major historical processes that have made our society
increasingly instrumental (Habermas, 1988:233-280). One individual broker’s life seems
short in that context. Abolafia’s anthropological studies of market makers point in the
same direction. Abolafia (1996:9) explains the stockbrokers’ culture as different from
other types of market makers’ as a consequence of that:
“7KH\ KDYH UHVSRQGHG WR GLIIHUHQW KLVWRULFDOO\ GHWHUPLQHG SUHVVXUHV
VLQFH WKHLU IRXQGLQJ LQ WKUHH GLIIHUHQW FHQWXULHV HLJKWHHQWK VWRFN
QLQHWHHQWKIXWXUHVDQGWZHQWLHWKRYHUWKHFRXQWHUERQGV´17
Hegel’s main interest was not to make an account of how stockbrokers become
instrumental or interactional, his interest was to develop a philosophy of the spirit. Also
Habermas’ focus can be said to be grander than the focus here. Abolafia on the other
hand has conducted research on actual stockbrokers doing their job on the New York
Stock Exchange. But regardless of his empirical focus, Abolafias anthropological interest
and his anthropological version of social constructionism seems to hinder him from
seeing differences between individual brokers, as well as giving the reproduction of
“culture” a more in time and space locally situated account. Both the here reported results
(stockbrokers working next to each other seems to be able to, during less than a decade,
develop different conceptions of work) and the theoretical statement by Habermas
(objectification can never be total) implies a more micro-oriented version of
constructionism.
Alternatives to the historical and anthropological accounts could be constructed.
The in time and space locally reproduced formal and informal organization of the brokers
could be one explanation the differences between the brokers. The here studied fourteen
brokers all have very similar formal working conditions, but there are differences. They do
have an observable but informal division of labors (the high-performing brokers talk more
during the morning meetings) and their physical location and conduct around the trading
table differs. Whom an inexperienced broker is placed next to might have a major impact
on how he will develop as a broker.
Another strategy in constructing a micro-oriented account of the brokers’ opposing
narratives is to invert the logic of explanation, or rather to view the development of
narratives and levels of performance as a dialectic process. Then the brokers’ different
performances explain their different narratives, just as much as the other way around. A
successful broker does not have to repair his failure by distancing himself from his work
by objectification, as the less successful broker tends to do. When the less successful
broker escapes his work and thus becomes alienated, the successful broker makes his
work his life, his life-world.
 Differences in observable conduct will be analyzed in another context. Here they
fill the function of suggesting alternatives to the more historical account of why brokers
think and behave as they do. The same can be said about the different ways one can
direct explanatory power between analytical entities. One might end this elaboration with
one last observation. The top-performing broker (broker “a” in table 1) was raised in a
small-company-family in “Småland”, an area in Sweden that are commonly known for its
entrepreneurial and Calvinistic mentality. The most bored broker (broker “e” in table 1)
was raised in a wealthy family living in “Östermalm”, the most exclusive and aristocratic
part of Stockholm City.
1DUUDWLYHVDQGSHUIRUPDQFH
In the research presented in this paper, I have made use of statistics and of unstructured
interviews. I have reflected upon my own intuitive induction. I have discussed other
persons’ thinking and conceptions, and I have made use of theories of some age, all this
in a package of “stories”, “dramas” and “narratives”. The choice of these linguistic
expressions could be seen as an opportunistic compliance to the rhetoric in vogue in
organizational analysis the last decade or to the linguistic turn in social science the last18
decades. I have not made use of linguistic theory, semiotic or discourse-analysis, I have
only borrowed some popular phrases.
To me the use of “narratives” fills another function than a mere cosmetic one. It
directs the reader’s attention towards the mediating use of language. It is a way of
expressing an interactionist ontology, and the importance of language in any interaction.
The quantitative performance measures in figure 1 and table 1, are examples of
language expressing something about the brokers’ actions. The four typical stories
express something about the brokers’ discourses. The two opposing narratives hopefully
express something about the brokers’ different underlying conceptions of work. My use
of “narratives” is not compliance to the linguistic turn, treating language as a self-
sustained system; it is to the contrary an appreciation of the ongoing mediating
processes between language, referent and subject. On this point, I fully agree with
Latour (1993:64), when he argues that:
³«LWLVKDUGWRLPDJLQHIRUORQJWKDWZHDUHDWH[WWKDWLVZULWLQJLWVHOID
GLVFRXUVH WKDW LV VSHDNLQJ DOO E\ LWVHOI D SOD\ RI VLJQLILHUV ZLWKRXW
VLJQLILHGV,WLVKDUGWRUHGXFHWKHHQWLUHFRVPRVWRDJUDQGQDUUDWLYHWKH
SK\VLFV RI VXEDWRPLF SDUWLFOHV WR D WH[W VXEZD\ V\VWHPV WR UKHWRULFDO
GHYLFHVDOOVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVWRGLVFRXUVH7KH(PSLUHRI6LJQVODVWHGQR
ORQJHU WKDQ $OH[DQGHU¶V DQG OLNH $OH[DQGHU¶V LW ZDV FDUYHG XS DQG
SDUFHOOHGRXWWRLWVJHQHUDOV«”
Analysis to me is just that - carving up. But one has to keep in memory, also Latour, that
the result of carving never is, never could be, andQHYHUVKRXOGEH the same as the
uncarved or precarved soil.
6RZKDW«WKHJUDQGHUWKHPH
So, the high performing stockbrokers are working in a social and meaningful life-world,
while the low-performers work in the abstract world of objects and systems. This is
neither well in line with the results from other studies of finance, nor with the grand
theme of critical theory. Abolafia (1996) describes the culture on Wall Street as a version
of the “…classic ‘trader mentality’, i.e. a risk-taking, hyper-rational, seat-of-the-pants
cognitive style” (Abolafia, 1996:  115). This is very well in line with the description of
finance in both traditional finance theory and in behavioral finance. According to
Habermas (1988), “risk-taking” and “hyper-rationality” are aspects of instrumental, not
communicative, action.
Neither Abolifia’s antropological descriptions of culture within finance, nor the
description of financial activity in the traditional finance or behavioral finance theory,
mention anything about an opposing element to the “risk-taking, hyper rational cognitive
style”. There is nothing mentioned about interactional playfulness, and nothing
mentioned about actors personalizing abstract information.
Knight (1997) argues that recent scandals and crisis, and the following regulation
of financial services, have radically changed the public profile of finance. Instead of
limiting the financial sectors influence on everyday life, the scandals and regulations




If Abolifia’s (1996) description of financial actors being instrumental is correct. And if
Knight’s (1997) account of that financial reasoning is becoming more common in the
everyday life. Financial research could be interpreted as supporting Habermas’ grand
theme of how the life-world is gradually transformed into a world of systems. Habermas’
theme is analogous with the so-called mass-society theorists, arguing that people in
general…
³«ORVHWKHLULGHQWLWLHVVRFLDOERXQGDULHVEUHDNGRZQDQGLQGLYLGXDOVIDFH
WKH ZRUOG LQ UHODWLYH LVRODWLRQ DV D SDUW RI D PDVV SXEOLF«´'L0DJJLR

The here presented results undermine both Abolifia’s and financial theorists’
descriptions of financial activity and the historical theme of Habermas and “mass-society
theorists”. If some actors within finance, and successful actors in specific, are better
described as working in a social life-world than in an instrumental world of systems, one
can speculate in that there always might be forces within instrumental worlds of systems
that will give birth to new life-worlds.
Even though generalizing the result of a study of 14 stockbrokers, conducted in
one year, to historical processes in modern society, might be regarded as somewhat
daring, this speculation also finds support in Giddens’ (199x) view on how modernity
affects social relations in a dialectic way. According to Giddens, increased distance
between persons who used to work together gives birth to new social relations.
Thus we might end this paper with optimism. One should be able to be successful
within finance without a “cunning consciousness”. And maybe our society can continue
to be rationalized without our life-worlds being transformed into instrumental objectified
systems. Or to paraphrase Weber: regardless of who will live in the cage in the future,
we do not know if this cage will be made out of iron or out of love.
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